North Korea is waving its sabers again. Or maybe that metallic jingle is actually the sound of two piggy banks shaking in stereo.

North Korean officials have been making noise for more than a month about the imminent possibility of a missile test, in defiance of the UN Security Council. Foreign diplomats in Pyongyang and tourists in South Korea have been warned that their security could be at risk due to the possibility of war. Last Thursday, North Korea claimed it had “powerful means of attack” on standby for a missile launch, drawing censure from G8 nations as well as others in the international community. (1)

Presumably, this rhetoric is directed at South Korea and its ally, the United States, which is to say, more or less business as usual in the North. But I suspect that Kim Jong Un has an additional target in mind this time: China.

North Korea often creates crises to get food aid and other concessions from South Korea and the United States. In 2009, Kim Jong Il prepared to launch his own missile, with this as one of his targets. There is no reason to doubt that it is also a prime target for his son, who took power last year after the death of Kim Jong Il. Kim Jong Un also needs to maximize his credibility with the country’s military, which, along with Pyongyang’s broader terror apparatus, keeps the Kim dynasty in power.

But I think that this time, Kim’s brinkmanship may target Beijing as much or even more than Seoul or Washington. Sure, the Chinese are deeply frustrated with their North Korean customers. But they also don’t want the North to collapse, both because it could send an avalanche of refugees to China and, more importantly, it would put a unified, democratic, US-allied South Korea right on the Chinese border.

If you want evidence that China remains committed to maintaining the Kim regime, consider: Speaking out against North Korea is still enough to lose a Chinese journalist his job in 48 hours.

North Korea owes its existence directly to China. Chinese troops saved North Korea from losing the Korean War in the early 1950s. Chinese trade and energy supplies have kept it in business through decades of severe economic mismanagement. Aid from South Korea and the rest of the international community has simply filled the North’s tank.

The recent turnaround in relations may result in large part from the fact that China has gotten rich, especially by North Korean standards. It’s like giving Kim a second piggy bank to shake. Kim probably thinks that if he shakes it up enough, the northern Chinese will happily provide whatever payment he can’t get from the south. He has no reason to worry which way the money is flowing, as long as it is to him.

One thing that will not happen, under any conceivable circumstances, is North Korea’s voluntary surrender of its missile and nuclear weapons programs. No amount of sanctions will make it do this, especially since China is not prepared to see Pyongyang fall. After watching events in Syria, Libya, Iran, and Iraq, Kim can rightly conclude that abominable dictators who lack nuclear weapons are subject to regime change, while those in possession of such weapons are not. The US-led policy of sanctioning Pyongyang to give up its weapons programs has, and will not, achieve anything.

There are only three conceivable courses of action for living with a nuclear North Korea: wait for the regime to rot or be overthrown from within; defeat him by force in a conflict that will go from horrible to unimaginable if China does not stand by; or wait for the Chinese to decide they are not willing to be blackmailed into funding the Kims indefinitely. The latter option is the most desirable, but it is hard to imagine before China evolves into a society more similar to South Korea’s. That change is not inconceivable, but it won’t happen quickly.

In the meantime, we can expect Kim to shake both piggy banks as hard as she can whenever she needs a coin.

Fountain:

1) The Guardian, “North Korea’s aggressive stance condemned by G8 in ‘strongest terms'”